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THE RIGHTS OF A REMITTER OF A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT
It is common in commercial transactions for the person making payment
to do so by personal check.' In certain situations; however, one may wish to
use the credit of a bank in addition to, or as a substitute for his own, and, in
such cases, he may purchase a different kind of negotiable instrument. This
instrument may take one of several forms, generally labeled as cashier's
check, bank draft,2
 traveler's check,3 postal money order,4
 and personal
money order. The purchaser of one of these instruments is commonly
called a remitter,a and his rights and duties are not expressly provided
for in the Code. In order to define his status, then, it is necessary to examine
the operation of the various instruments involved and to consider as well the
sources of law which supplement the Code.°
The drawer 7
 of a personal check is a creditor of the drawee bank, and his
check is an orders to that bank to pay a sum certain to a designated person
or his order. It is essential to note at this point that the check is merely an
order, and "does not of itself operate as an assignment of any funds . . . . 2,10
Moreover, since the check is only an order, the Code explicitly gives
1
 "Check" is defined in U.C.C. § 3-104(1), (2)(b). All Code citations are to the
1962 Official Text.
2 Courts do not always make the distinction between cashier's checks and bank
drafts, and they often define the former as a check of the bank's cashier on his or on
another bank. See, e.g., Leo Syntax Auto Sales, Inc. v. Peoples Bank & Say. Co., 6 Ohio
Misc. 226, 215 N.E.2d 68 (C.P. 1965). See Annot., 107 A.L.R. 1463 (1937). For the
purposes of this comment, however, this distinction will be made, and a "bank draft" will
refer only to a draft drawn by one bank upon another.
3
 Express companies often issue traveler's checks through a bank which acts as a
selling agent for the company. Hawkland, American Travelers Checks, 15 Buffalo L. Rev.
501, 503 (1966). This comment will be concerned only with traveler's checks issued by
a bank.
4
 The issuing of money orders by the government is the exercise of a governmental
function for the public benefit, and such money orders are not subject to commercial
law. Bolognesi v. United States, 189 Fed. 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1911).
9
 The term remitter used in its business sense applies to any person who sends
money credit to another, usually through the medium of a bank or commercial
credit house. The remittance may be made by negotiable instrument with the
remitter acting as purchaser, payee or indorsee . . . .
Beutel, Rights of Remitters or Other Owners Not Within the Tenor of Negotiable In-
struments, 12 Minn. L. Rev. 584, 588 (1928).
• For the supplementary sources of law specifically provided for in the Code, see
U.C.C. § 1-103.
7 The drawer's contract is set forth in U.C.C. § 3-413(2).
8 U.C.C. § 3-104(2)(a)-(b).
o U.C.C. § .3-104(1)(b), -106.
10 U.C.C. § 3-409(1).
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the drawer the right to countermand it before it is paid, accepted, or
certified by the drawee." Similarly, the drawee is not liable until it accepts
or certifies a check," and a stop-order complied with before that time will
in no way impair the drawee's credit. As a result of its acceptance," the
bank becomes primarily liable on the instrument, and the drawer's liability
becomes secondary.
Under the Code, moreover, certification operates as acceptance." Once
certified, a check loses its character as a mere order, and the bank becomes
liable to the holder." If the bank certifies at the request of the holder, the
bank becomes solely liable on the instrument, and the drawer is discharged."
"The theory for such release is that the holder, by requesting certification in-
stead of payment, enters into a new contract with the bank, and one not
within the contemplation of the drawer or a prior indorser."" Certification
by the holder, therefore, has the same effect as payment, and the drawer has
no further interest in the check.
Certification by the drawer, on the other hand, does not have entirely
this same legal effect, but under the Code the drawer does lose his right to
countermand." When the drawer procures the certification, there is no
discharge, and he remains liable on the check. Because of this liability, pre-
Code law allowed the drawer to stop payment when the check was in the
hands of one not a holder in due course° and the drawer had a defense. 2°
The Code has eliminated this distinction, however, and provides that once
certified by either holder or drawer, a check is not subject to a stop-order. 21
The principal reason for the Code rule is that, as "acceptor," the bank has en-
gaged to pay the instrument, and it "is not required to impair [its] . . . credit
by refusing payment for the convenience of the drawer." 22 In considering the
status of the remitter, then, it will be essential to remember that once an
ordinary check has been certified or accepted, the drawer has lost the right
to countermand.
When a remitter chooses to make payment by cashier's check, traveler's
check, or bank draft, he is not a party to the instrument and, consequently,
he is in no way liable on it. For example, a cashier's check is drawn by a bank
upon itself to the order of another person. Technically, it is a bill of exchange
which is accepted at the moment of its issuance, and the bank, as acceptor,
11 U.C.C. § 3-303, 4-303.
12	 § 3-410, -411.
13 	§ 3-413(1).
U.C.C. § 3-411.
16 U.C.C, § 3-413. "Holder" is defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(20).
16 U.C.C. § 3 -411(1).
17 The Law of Certification of Checks, 78 Banking L.J. 369, 377 (1961).
18 U.C.C. § 4-303(1)(a).
10 "Holder in due course" is defined in U.C.C. § 3-302. Section 3-305(1) provides:
"To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes the instrument free from
(I) all the claims to it on the part of any person ...."
20 For a discussion of certified checks under both Code and pre-Code Iaw, see
14 Wyo. L.J. 39 (1960).
21 U.C.C. § 4-303(1)(a).
22 	§ 4-403, Comment 5.
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contracts to "pay the instrument according to its tenor at the time of [its]
. . . engagement . . . . "23
 Under section 3-413(1), this contract is exactly. the
same as the contract of a maker, and since the bank has the obligation of a
maker, it is not at all unreasonable that section 3-118(a) provides that such
a check is effective as a note. In the same way, it has been held that the payee
is entitled to treat a cashier's check as a note, i.e., the primary obligation of
the bank, binding on the bank even without presentment and without further
acceptance by the bank.24
 Since the remitter is not liable on the instrument,
and it is the bank which has the liability of a maker or drawer, the remitter
is a stranger to the bank's obligation, and therefore, by definition, the remit-
ter has no right to countermand the payment of a cashier's check.
A traveler's check is different in appearance from a cashier's check, but
it is essentially the same kind of commercial paper. The purchaser signs the
instrument in the upper left or right hand corner when it is purchased, and
the drawer bank promises to pay the amount of the check when it is counter-
signed by this person. The countersignature gives the instrument its nego-
tiability, and it is at this time that the bank's obligation arises. 28 In both
the cashier's check and the traveler's check, then, the drawer and the drawee
are the same person, and the liability of the remitter and the issuer is the
same in each case.
The bank draft differs from the cashier's check and the traveler's check
in that it is drawn by one bank upon another. Unlike the parties to those two
instruments, then, the drawer and drawee of a bank draft are separate en-
tities, and the instrument is not in the nature of a promissory note. Tech-
nically, therefore, it is possible for the drawer bank to cooperate with the
remitter and stop payment on his behalf. In the New York case of Interna-
tional Firearms Co. v. Kingston Trust Co.," the court held that since the pur-
chase of the bank draft resulted in an executed sale of credit not subject to
rescission or countermand, payment could not be stopped even by mutual
agreement of the drawer bank and depositor. Under section 4-403(1) of the
Code, however, "a customer" has the right to stop payment on a check, and
the definition of "customer" includes "a bank carrying an account with an-
other bank."27 This section establishes only that the drawer bank could stop
payment and, as in the case of the certified check, the bank is by no means re-
quired to impair its credit for the convenience of a customer. Nor does it
appear likely that a bank would be willing to exercise this power even as a
favor to the remitter. As drawer, the bank has contracted to pay the holder
of the draft28 and, since it cannot assert any of the remitter's defenses in an
action by such holder, 29 an attempt to stop payment would ultimately be
futile.
25 	§ 3-413(1).
24 In re Pascal's Estate, 3 Misc. 2d 136, 139, 146 N.Y.S.2d 364, 367 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
25 	§ 3-104, Comment 4.
26 6 N.Y.2d 406, 160 N.E.2d 656, 189 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1959).
27 U.C.C. § 4-104(1)(e).
28 U.C.C. § 3-413(2).
29 U.C.C. 3-306(d). The bank would be allowed to raise the defenses of theft
or that the holder took through a restrictive indorsement.
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Under section 3-603, however, there are two situations in which a drawer
bank will not be discharged even if it does make payment, and therefore it
would probably be willing to stop payment. These cases are those in which
the remitter "supplies indemnity deemed adequate by the [bank] . . or
enjoins payment or satisfaction by order of a court of competent jurisdiction
in an action in which the [remitter] . . . and the holder are parties." 3° If
the bank's refusal to pay results in an action by the holder against the bank,
the remitter will have the opportunity to intervene in that action and assert
his claim.3' Section 3-603 requires this procedure so as to protect the obligor
as well as the holder of the instrument. It relieves the bank of the responsi-
bility of raising defenses which it might have difficulty proving. In this respect,
then, the bank draft differs from the cashier's check in that the drawer bank
can stop payment if it so chooses and there are at least two cases in which
such a choice is likely to be made.
Given the fact that the the remitter has no right to stop payment on a
cashier's check, traveler's check, or bank draft, the question remains as to
what rights the remitter does possess. In dealing with this question, the
courts have considered various theories, 32 but they have generally rejected
the theory that the bank is an agent for the remitter,33 or that a trust rela-
tionship is established. 34 Under the most widely adopted theory, the trans-
action is viewed as a completed sale of the bank's credit to the remitter
by which the money paid to the bank becomes the bank's property. 33 Accord-
ingly, the contract to pay runs not to the remitter but to the holder of the
instrument.
As owner of the instrument, however, the remitter may choose not to
transmit it to the payee and, under general banking practice, he will be able
to recover from the obligor." The difficult question arises when the remitter
has delivered the instrument to one not a holder in due course. In such a case,
his remedies are not provided by the Code but by supplementary principles
of law. That such other remedies were contemplated by the draftsmen is
indicated by comment 2 to section 3-207 which provides:
The remedy of any such claimant is to recover the paper by replevin
or otherwise; to impound it or to enjoin its enforcement, collection or
negotiation; or to intervene in any action brought by the holder
against the obligor.
It is apparent that one who has chosen to effect payment of a debt by
use of a cashier's check, traveler's check, or bank draft is, as a practical
matter, left to his defenses on the contract only. Moreover, one making a gift
3° U.C.C. § 3-603(1).
31 U.C.C. § 3-306(d).
32 See 33 Yale L.J. 177 (1923).
88 E.g., Safian v. Irving Nat'I Bank, 202 App. Div. 459, 196 N.Y.S. 141 (1922).
34 E.g., Montana-Wyoming Ass'n of Credit Men v. Commercial Nat'I Bank, 80
Mont, 174, 259 Pac. 1060 (1927).
33 E,g., International Firearms Co, v. Kingston Trust Co., supra note 26; Kerr S.S.
Co. v. Chartered Bank of India, Australia Sr China, 292 N.Y. 253, 54 N.E.2d 813 (1944).
36 See Britton, Bills and Notes 300-01 (1943) ; Moore, The Right of the Remitter
of a Bill or Note, 20 Colum. L. Rev. 749 (1920).
263
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
by such means would have no remedy at all. Although the remedies open to
the remitter are at best inconvenient, the advantages of using these instru-
ments are also apparent. They are available for immediate use in banking
circles and are readily accepted in distant markets where a personal check
might not be honored. The public relies on these instruments as cash substi-
tutes, and one who uses them is justifiably subject to the disadvantages
encountered by one who makes payments in cash. It is clear, then, that the
right of countermand is quite properly denied to the remitter of any of these
instruments.
A fairly new instrument, generally characterized as a "personal money
order,"" presents problems which are different from those encountered above.
This instrument bears the name and address of the bank and contains the
words "personal money order." The form generally provides that the check
is not valid over a certain amount and, when issued 38
 for a nominal fee, the
exact amount is inserted by the bank. A blank is provided for the name of
the payee, and further blanks are provided in the lower right hand corner
for the name and address of the purchaser. The problem facing the courts is
whether to treat this instrument as a cashier's check of the bank or as the
personal check of the purchaser. Two New York decisions have reached
opposite results.
In Rose Check Cashing Serv. v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 19
the court held that the instrument was in essence a cashier's check and there-
fore a primary obligation of the bank. The court relied upon the visible dif-
ferences between the personal money order and the personal check, as well
as the differences in the underlying relationships of the parties. The words
"personal money order" appeared prominently on the face of the instrument,
and, where the maker or the drawer ordinarily signed, there was an additional
line for the address of the signer. The court stated that this requirement was
ordinarily for an indorser or a co-maker but not for a drawer. 4° The court
gave little weight to the fact that there was no cashier's signature on the in-
strument and held that the printed name of the bank was sufficient.
The court found the underlying relationship between the parties to a
personal money order to be different from that of the parties to a personal
check. A personal check involves no assignment of funds until the check is
accepted or paid, but the court concluded that the purchase of a personal
money order was a sale where the "funds to pay the instrument . . . immedi-
ately come within the bank's exclusive control and ownership."41 Following
this reasoning, the court decided that the instrument was in the nature of a
cashier's check and, therefore, that the bank's liability arose upon sale of the
instrument; thus, there could be no right to stop payment.
87 See Rose Check Cashing Serv. v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 40
Misc. 2d 995, 996, 244 N.Y.S.2d 474, 475 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1963), aff'd, 43 Misc. 2d
679, 252 N.Y.S.2d 100 (App. T. 1964).
38 U.C.C. § 3-102(1) (a) defines "issue" as "the first delivery of an instrument to a
holder or a remitter."
39 Supra note 37.
40 Id. at 997, 244 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
41 Id. at 998, 244 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
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In Garden Check Cashing Serv., Inc. v. First Nat'l City Bank,42 the
Appellate Division came to the opposite result and decided that this kind of
instrument was more Iike a personal check, with the purchaser as drawer and
the bank as drawee. The court stated that if the instrument were a cashier's
check drawn by the bank upon itself, it would be non-negotiable, since it
had not been signed by the drawer as required by section 3-104(1) (a). 43
The court decided, therefore, that it was not a cashier's check, and that the
bank's liability arose only upon certification or acceptance of the instrument.
Since it was thus in the nature of a personal check, the instrument could be
countermanded in the same manner.
The basic difference between the decisions of the two courts is the
weight given to the fact that the cashier's signature did not appear on the
instrument. One court dismissed it as irrelevant and found that the printed
signature of the bank was sufficient, while the other court found that the lack
of the signature would have made the instrument non-negotiable. The prob-
lem is by no means clear, as there are persuasive arguments for either side.
Under sections 3-104(2) and 1-201(39), it could be argued that the printed
name of the bank is sufficient as its signature. On the other hand, it can
be argued that in the past, when a bank has intended to be primarily bound,
as in the case of cashier's checks and traveler's checks, it has evidenced its
intent by including the cashier's signature. It could therefore be inferred that
the absence of the signature on the personal money order is an indication
that the banks do not intend to be so bound. 44
A corollary to the question of the nature of the bank's signature is the
question of the nature of the purchaser's signature. Section 3-402 states that
"unless the instrument clearly indicates that a signature is made in some other
capacity it is an indorsement." The comment points out, however, that by
long established practice a signature in the lower right hand corner of an
instrument indicates an intent to sign as maker of a note or drawer of a draft.
The signature of the purchaser, therefore, could be that of either a drawer
or an indorser.
As for the issue of the remitter's right to stop payment, the Code leaves
unsettled the question of whether the personal money order should be treated
as a cashier's check or as a personal check subject to countermand; perhaps,
therefore, considerations of commercial policy should be controlling. To
treat the personal money order as a cashier's check would satisfy no dis-
cernible commercial need and, in fact, it would disregard the essential char-
acteristics of the personal money order. Commercial demands are adequately
served by other well-established instruments such as the cashier's check and
the bank draft; a third such commercial tool would be superfluous. Further-
more, as the personal money order is available only in amounts under $300,
it is unsuitable for use in any significant commercial transaction.
On the other hand, the personal money order could be uniquely tailored
to the day-to-day needs of the ordinary consumer who, for some reason, does
42 25 App. Div, 2d 137, 267 N.Y.S.2d 698 (1966).
43 Id. at 140, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 701.
44 See U.C.C. § 1-205(2).
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not have the convenience of a personal checking account. For this consumer,
the fact that the instrument is available only in small denominations is not a
bar to its usefulness, and, if it is treated as a personal check with the cor-
responding right to countermand, the personal money order will be ideally
responsive to his needs. 45
 The only real policy objection to this treatment of
the personal money order is that the public might have come to rely on it as a
cash substitute. If this is the case, however, it would seem that this reliance
must as yet be insubstantial, since the personal money order has been devel-
oped only recently. On balance, then, it would seem that the public interest
would best be served by analogizing the remitter of a personal money order
to the drawer of a personal check. It does not appear that there is any com-
pelling statutory or policy basis for doing otherwise.
JANE E. ToniN
45 For example, consider any individual who is incapable of managing a checking
account, or the teenager or pensioner who will use a negotiable instrument only occasion-
ally. It is also important that these instruments are often sold in shopping centers and
the like, and are thus very useful to one who cannot conveniently conduct his business
in normal banking hours. Obviously these consumers are not adequately served by
remedies such as the injunction; for them, the right to countermand is the only practical
remedy.
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